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Viewed from a Western historical-philosophical perspective, there seem to be at least three 
broad philosophical orientations on the basis of which Christian educators could approach 
their pedagogical task. The first is to approach it from a modernist (foundationalist, rationalist) 
perspective in terms of which the principles and guidelines gleaned from the Bible are cast into a 
coherent and all-embracing theory that is deterministically applied to ensure certain pedagogical 
outcomes. The second is just the opposite, namely to operate post-foundationalistically on the basis 
of a loose collection of Biblical principles and values, and hence to expect the child or young person 
to muddle through in the postmodern maze in which they are growing up nowadays. The third, 
referred to in this article as a post-post-foundationalist orientation, an orientation that arguably 
also can respond appropriately to post-modern conditions, allows the educator to effectively steer 
through between these two extremes. 
Keywords: Christian educators, foundationalist, post(post) foundationalism, postmodern 
conditions
Daar is, gesien vanuit Westerse histories-filosofiese perspektief, ten minste drie breë filosofiese 
oriëntasies op grondslag waarvan die Christenopvoeder sy or haar pedagogiese taak kan uitvoer. 
Die eerste is om vanuit ’n modernistiese (foundationalistiese, rasionalistiese) perspektief die 
beginsels en riglyne wat uit die Skrif verkry word te giet in ’n samehangende en alomvattende teorie 
wat deterministies toegepas kan word ten einde sekere uitkomste met die opvoedingshandeling te 
verseker. Die tweede is presies die teenoorgestelde hiervan, naamlik om post-foundationalisties 
op te voed aan die hand van ’n losse versameling Bybelse beginsels en waardes, en in werklikheid 
te verwag dat die kind of die jongmens maar deur die hedendaagse postmoderne doolhof 
moet voortstrompel. Die derde oriëntasie, waarna in hierdie artikel verwys word as post-post-
foundationalisties en wat dalk ook gepas is vir die huidige postmoderne omstandighede, laat die 
opvoeder toe om effektief tussen hierdie twee uiterstes deur te stuur.
Sleutelterme: Christelike opvoeders, foundationalisties, post(post) foundationalisme, post-
moderne toestande
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SHORTCOMINGS OF BOTH A 
FOUNDATIONALIST AND A POST-
FOUNDATIONALIST ORIENTATION WITH 
REFERENCE TO A BIBLICAL APPROACH TO 
EDUCATION
The phrase “Biblical approach to education” simply means 
that an educator such as a parent or a teacher approaches his 
or her pedagogical interactions with another person, usually 
a child or a young adult, on the basis of certain principles 
and perspectives that have been gleaned from the Bible. 
The straightforwardness of this statement can be deceptive, 
however, because the explanatory phrase “on the basis of certain 
perspectives that have been gleaned from the Bible” elicits 
a number of further questions. Only one of those questions 
concerns us here, namely: on the basis of which philosophical 
orientation does an educator (or: should an educator) glean 
perspectives on education from the Bible, and from which 
philosophical orientation does (or should) he or she process and 
systematise such perspectives into an entirety or “whole” that 
makes sense to the educator and all other parties involved in 
the pedagogical experience? The question can also be phrased 
as follows: does the educator just select, in eclectic fashion, a 
number of loose perspectives and apply them as conditions 
dictate, or does she attempt to fuse all the different perspectives 
into a single cohesive pedagogical approach or view that can be 
systematically applied so that certain predictable outcomes can 
be reached? And if she fuses them into a systematic approach, 
on the basis of what fundamental or worldview perspective 
does she do this, or should she do this?
The questions above demonstrate that there are at least two 
avenues open to educators. On the one hand, an educator could 
avail herself of a plethora of disparate Biblical pointers with 
respect to education, act upon them, and hope for the desired 
pedagogical outcome. On the other hand, she could attempt 
to fuse them all together into a coherent framework, thought 
system or what has become known as a grand narrative, and 
apply this system systematically and conscientiously for the 
purpose of attaining certain predictable pedagogical outcomes. 
As will be argued below, the first approach could be seen as 
post-modernistic or post-foundationalist, and the second as 
modernistic or foundationalist. These terms will be explained 
in more detail as the argument unfolds.
There is a third possibility, however, and that is the main thrust 
of this article, namely an attempt could be made on the part 
of the educator who wishes to educate on the basis of Biblical 
principles to steer a course between these alternatives, a third 
way which we will refer to below as a post-post-foundationalist 
approach to education theory and practice based on Biblical 
principles. We live in times that are characterised by the co-
existence of all three of these perspectives; it has therefore 
become necessary for educators working on the basis of 
Biblical principles to reflect on the viability of these possible 
orientations and to decide upon the one that would best suit an 
attempt to educate from a Biblical perspective. 
The purpose of this article is to help with such reflection. In 
order to reach its goal, the remainder of this article is structured 
as follows. The next section contains an analysis of a recent 
contribution towards post-post-foundationalism in which two 
points are raised: the need to develop an approach appropriate 
for post-post-foundationalist times, and the need to develop a 
post-post-foundationalist Biblical worldview per se. The sections 
thereafter are devoted to discussions of foundationalism, post-
foundationalism and post-post-foundationalism and their 
implications for education on Biblical grounds. The article 
concludes with a recommendation about the way forward for 
education from a Biblical perspective.
OLTHUIS’ BOLD GAMBIT
Olthuis (2012) recently made a noteworthy attempt to move the 
notion of a Biblical worldview into the arena of 21st century 
(postmodern) thought. He firstly asserted that there seems to be 
general agreement that “there are no innocent, unbiased ways 
of looking at the world, that everyone wears glasses and looks at 
the world through a particular lens, window or frame, the idea 
of worldview has become common currency” (Olthuis 2012:1). 
Postmodernism has vindicated the notion among Christian 
scholars that “all knowledge is perspectival, worldview-ish, 
rooted in a particular historical and cultural setting, rather than 
universal or absolute” (Olthuis 2012:1). None of us, he claims, 
begins from a position of innocence; prejudices are not all bad 
– they are the frames (worldviews) from which we see the world 
and make sense of it. We all begin and end in the surrender of 
faith. We all work from a certain spiritual vantage point (cf. 
Olthuis 2012:5). Postmodernism, he continues (Olthuis 2012:2), 
does not need to be seen as the enemy; he substantiates this by 
saying that in his article he “will be arguing that, in a number 
of important aspects, Postmodernism is more a boon than a 
bane to the cause of Christ. Indeed, as [he sees] it, there are a 
number of cardinal features of Postmodernism that deserve 
to be recognised, honoured and accounted for in a Christian 
worldview – even if, in terms of the Gospel, they will be revised, 
even radicalised, in what [he] calls a post-postmodern biblical 
worldview” (Olthuis 2012:2). In view of this, Olthuis (2012:1-
2) made the bold move to seek for an alternative, which he 
formulates as follows: “How best do we advocate – and if 
necessary, rework or recalibrate – a biblical worldview in 
our postmodern world of the 21st century? Indeed, I will be 
working towards the formation of what I will be calling a post-
postmodern Christian worldview.” 
Analysis of this intention shows that Olthuis has touched on 
two different problems. He firstly speaks of a Biblical worldview 
IN and FOR our postmodern world of the 21st century, and 
secondly, of the formulation of a post-postmodern worldview 
per se. These two formulations have implications for the future 
of a Biblical worldview in the modern world: (a) A biblical 
worldview IN and FOR a postmodern cultural dispensation may 
remain unchanged in itself; we only need to find ways to make it 
plausible and acceptable in order to stem the tide of secularism; 
the Biblical worldview itself remains in essence untouched. 
(b) The formulation of a post-postmodern Biblical worldview 
per se, on the other hand, would entail a change in and of the 
Biblical worldview itself; the Biblical worldview itself will be 
changed or adapted to postmodern conditions. The question 
then arises whether a Biblical worldview could be reworked in 
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such a manner. Will it not lose its intrinsic Biblical character? 
Olthuis (2012:2) seems to think that such a change or adaptation 
is possible, hence his claim that “there are certain cardinal 
features of Postmodernism that deserve to be recognised, 
honoured and accounted for in a Christian worldview…” He 
then devotes the rest of the argument in his article to his effort 
to show how such recognition of postmodernism could be 
accounted for in a Christian worldview.
AN EVEN EARLIER ATTEMPT TO 
CIRCUMNAVIGATE BOTH FOUNDATIONALISM 
AND POST-FOUNDATIONALISM
Although, as far as could be established, Olthuis (2012) has made 
a breakthrough with his effort to revisit the Christian worldview 
in order to move beyond foundationalism (modernism) and 
post-foundationalism (postmodernism), he was not the first 
to attempt such a move. As far back as the 1990s, certain 
scholars felt that something might be amiss with the current 
philosophical orientation, namely the choice that people had 
between two equally unacceptable coexistent orientations: 
foundationalism (modernism) and post-foundationalism 
(postmodernism) (Talin & Ellis 2002:36). In reaction, cultural 
philosopher Frederick Turner (1990a, 1990b, 1991a, 1991b, 
1995), for instance, came up with the idea of a radical centre 
of values, a stance that according to him evades both the rigid 
formalism and moralism of foundationalism and the relativism 
of post-foundationalism. 
Turner (2000: passim) was convinced that in postmodern 
circumstances people find it difficult to share the same value 
system, and he came up with the idea of a solvent in the form 
of a radical centre of values that could help people come to an 
understanding of a common medium for all kinds of cultural 
information, a set of values that all people potentially could 
agree to, and on which they could base their future interactions 
with one another (Turner 1990a:85, 97). He argued that as the 
human race recognised itself as a “we” it will be more and 
more surprised by the otherness of the other. Turner made 
this claim in the hope that moral values may one day be less 
arbitrary and thus more negotiable than they are today. In brief, 
Turner (1990b:745) hoped that it might be possible to develop 
some universal norms from an understanding of human 
nature. In his own way, according to Talen and Ellis (2002:36), 
Turner defined a position that “rejects … the acute relativism 
of postmodernists and the rigid moralism of traditional 
conservatives” (i.e. modernists or foundationists, as we would 
refer to them today).
Turner’s thesis of a radical centre of values has echoed in the 
thoughts of others (from a variety of religious, philosophical 
and life view perspectives), such as Hampshire (2003:133, 137-
139) who contended that the problem of different and frequently 
conflicting values can be resolved through arbitration in a 
rational and logical way by people intent on peacefully living 
together. Bower (2005: 225) also argued that values were largely 
universal, and Grayling (2002:8) that an informed mind will 
come out in favour of the truth. Harris (2010:70) searched for a 
structure that reflects and enforces our deeper understanding of 
human well-being. Wright (2009: 424-426) and Rée and Urmson 
(2005:125) depend on intuition to bring us to general moral 
principles. The core of the radical centre of values, according to 
Talen and Ellis (2002:36, 37), is the thesis that there are durable, 
lasting and time-tested truths, values and discoveries that 
might be gleaned from the value systems that all individuals 
hold. Needleman’s (2008: 108-109) “ethics of the threshold” 
theory and Makrides’ (2013:264, 266) trans-confessional theory 
are also akin to Turner’s radical centre of values thesis. In Talen 
and Ellis’ (2002:37) opinion, there is a need for such normative 
theorising in a world stripped of meaning by postmodernism 
and reductionist views of nature and society. Our view of the 
world, Needleman (2008:107) insists, should be based on our 
answers to the question who one is, what one ought to be and 
how one ought to behave. People need a society that is relatively 
free from unpredictability (Parekh 2000:145), something that is 
impossible in the fluid conditions of postmodernism.
A comparison of the post-post-modern approaches of Olthuis 
(see previous section) and Turner cum suis reveals that whereas 
the latter aimed at discovering a radical centre of values in a 
secular (non-religious, non-spiritual, non-faith) sense, Olthuis 
aimed at getting around the value fluidity of postmodernism by 
suggesting an overhaul of the Christian or Biblical worldview or 
at least a reinterpretation of certain basic tenets of the Christian 
worldview in terms that would make sense in postmodern 
conditions. Turner cum suis seemed to search for common 
ground in a set of shared secular values, which according to 
Swartz (2006), Zecha (2007) and Nieuwenhuis (2010) must 
unavoidably be minimalistic. This does not mean, however, that 
Christians cannot participate in a search for common ground in 
terms of shared values. Van der Walt (2007: 156), for instance, 
mentions the possibility of searching for common values 
through interactive dialogue, Powlinson (2003: 242) sought 
for a unifying perspective and Lategan (2010:152) suggests that 
“certain intellectual judgements” could perform this task.
While radical Christian thinkers such as Van der Walt, Powlinson 
and Lategan, including educationists such as the author of this 
article, understand the value of searching for a radical centre 
of values where people of different religious and worldview 
persuasion could meet and interact for the sake of peaceful 
coexistence, they find this solution to the problem of getting 
around both foundationalism and post-foundationalism 
unsatisfactory because of the thinness or minimalistic nature of 
the values in the radical value centre. The way shown by Olthuis 
is more satisfactory in that it conforms to Christians’ calling as 
children of the Lord. The remainder of this article is, therefore, 
devoted to a tentative search for a post-post-foundationalist 
approach to education based on Biblical principles.
FOUNDATIONALISM AND POST-
FOUNDATIONALISM NOT THE ANSWER
Foundationalism, in the “classical” sense, was part of the 
Enlightenment project: human reason was supposed to be able 
to attain certain knowledge based on self-evident foundational 
experiences or a priori propositions from which necessary and 
universal conclusions could be reached.    Absolutism  guided 
the definition of Reason (with a capital “R”). In some cases, 
foundationalists saw scientific language as attempting to 
Page 4 of 8
www.koersjournal.org.za
Original Research
dx.doi.org/10.19108/koers.80.1.2211
re-present a meta-narrative System (with a capital “S”) that 
corresponds precisely to reality, while others settled for a local-
narrative system (with a lower case “s”) that is merely internally 
coherent (Schults 1999:2). A modernist or foundationalist 
approach to life is characterised by the assumption that there 
are certain fixed and firm foundations in the form of widely 
accepted norms, principles or values, usually embodied in 
life and world views or in philosophical systems (Makrides 
2013:253). It is also characterised by a systematic appeal to 
human reasoning to gain an understanding of reality (Makrides 
2013:255, 271, 272). It assumes that we have foundational 
beliefs that are independent of the support of other beliefs 
(Schults 1999:2). In its quest for a totalizing knowledge of the 
truth, foundationalism privileges epistemology as the primary 
enterprise of philosophy (Schults 1999:8).  
While Christian educationists reject the foundationalist 
deification of reason and the certainty sought within the modern 
project, inter alia in its positivistic guise (Makrides 2013:271-2), 
they also question, together with the postmodernists (post-
foundationalists), the validity of all-encompassing narratives 
and absolute claims for capturing and understanding reality 
in an objective way. They do not, however, go as far as some 
post-, anti- or non-foundationalists as to take total leave of firm 
foundations in the form of the norms, principles or values that 
they glean or derive from the Bible and which are embodied in 
a Biblical life and worldview. 
Generally speaking, post-foundationalists (postmodernists) 
tend to hold the belief that reality is more complex and multi-
layered than one might at first glance think, and hence requires 
a more flexible and open attitude that allows for the existence 
of even contradictory perspectives (Makrides 2013:271-2). 
As mentioned, post-foundationalism has generally moved 
away from all-encompassing narratives and absolute claims 
for capturing and understanding reality in an objective way. 
Since humans are seen as forming an integral part of reality, 
intending to understand it not as outside or neutral observers 
but as involved persons, the attainment of final, precise, 
objective and perennial knowledge about things may be seen 
as rather illusory, undermining the optimism about correct 
knowledge, the necessity to control the world, the dream of 
absolute certainty and the making of universal claims that 
are supported in one or the other form in the modern context. 
Postmodernism as post-foundationalism stands rather for 
the relativity and the partiality of all human discourses, a 
pluralism of methods and approaches, the multidimensionality 
of reality, and the potential of mixing seemingly incompatible 
perspectives (Makrides 2013:273). 
Postmodernists – post-foundationalists, as they will henceforth 
be referred to - see the world as multi-layered, plural and 
tolerant, allowing many, even mutually contradictory 
standpoints in their ranks. Post-foundationalism also has 
a relativising character that rejects notions of exclusivity, 
absoluteness (in the sense of thinking on the basis of firm 
and solid norms or life view foundations) (Makrides 2013: 
253). Post-foundationalists not only question but also reject 
the systematic appeal to human reasoning but also relativise 
a systematic appeal to human reasoning and recognise the 
contingency and limitations of human discursive (verbal and 
non-verbal) potential and practices when attempting to gain 
an understanding of reality (Makrides 2013:255, 271, 272). 
They have relinquished the dream of controlling the world, 
of absolute certainty and the making of universal claims. 
They rather stand for the relativity and the partiality of all 
human discourse, a pluralism of methods and approaches, 
the multidimensionality of reality, and the potential of mixing 
seemingly incompatible perspectives (Makrides 2013:273). 
Post-foundationalists believe, says Schults (1999:3, 8), that we 
cannot get “behind” or “under” our beliefs to justify them; all 
we have are the criteria of coherence with other beliefs within 
our culturally conditioned web. 
Educationalists and educators who base their pedagogical 
work on Biblical principles and norms find a radical post-
foundationalist approach to education as unacceptable as a 
foundationalist approach, and indeed for the reasons discussed 
in the following section (with reference to Richard Rorty’s post-, 
anti- or non-foundationalist views. Rorty’s views are relevant in 
pedagogical context because of his ideas about edification. In 
developing his views regarding this subject, he tends not only 
towards a post-foundational view but also to an anti- or non-
foundationalist stance.).
The need for a firmer “principial1” foundation
According to Wright (2010:120-123), Rorty’s views could 
mean the end of education as we know it because they imply 
a detachment of knowledge from reality; understanding 
could be equated with unconstrained imagination, solipsistic 
experience and interpretation, and education limited to the 
role of stimulating private desires. Education along the lines 
proposed by anti- or non-foundationalists such as Rorty could 
lead to students failing to obtain knowledge of reality because 
they might be led to believe that there is no such thing as 
objective reality, no actual order of things, and that the notion 
of “reality” only exists within the teacher and the students’ 
conventions, linguistic constructions and personal experience. 
To educate along these lines, according to Wright (2010:123), 
is to fall into the epistemic fallacy of confusing reality with 
knowledge of reality – the fallacy of denying the reality of the 
universe simply because it is beyond our intellectual powers to 
fully comprehend it. 
To deny the existence of foundations such as principles, norms 
and firm life and world view suppositions is likewise fallacious. 
The fallacy of such denial can be illustrated from the work of 
post-foundationalist Rorty himself, where he appeals to the 
norms and standards of neo-liberalism, social-democracy, a 
particular community, practice, experience and effectiveness 
in practice (does it work? as a norm). In one of his books, Rorty 
(1999:xxii-xxv) pertinently refers to norms such as “more 
useful and the less useful,” its effectiveness in attempting “to 
serve transitory purposes and solve transitory problems,” its 
efficiency in accomplishing a certain task, its ability to “achieve 
coordination of behaviour,” its ability to “suit our purposes.” 
1  This neologism embodies the idea of a foundation consisting of 
definite principles or points of departure.
Page 5 of8
www.koersjournal.org.za
Original Research
dx.doi.org/10.19108/koers.80.1.2211
Elsewhere (Rorty 1996b:45) he makes statements that clearly 
refer to norms such as those referred to above, illustrating that it 
is indeed impossible for any person to think and argue without 
appeal to some or other foundation, whether this foundation 
is only superficial, as in Rorty’s case, or deep and profound, as 
in the case of individuals who appeal to life and world view 
principles and even religious convictions. Lee (2007:163-164) 
is therefore correct in concluding that “Rorty drop[ped] the 
anchor of his epistemology of justification of knowledge not on 
a foundational proposition, but on society.”
Van Niekerk (2005:22, 24, 26, 28, 31, 33, 35, 39) also launched 
several points of criticism against Rorty’s anti- or post-
foundationalism: his unwillingness to strive for certain 
knowledge and grounded facts; his derivation of norms from 
certain communities and traditions; his search for generally 
acceptable “truths” (which is reminiscent of Turner’s radical 
value centre theory); his Darwinian-pragmatistic view that 
knowledge claims only make sense in relation to functions and 
purposes, and that knowledge acquisition is nothing more than 
a set of coping mechanisms in terms of which we survive; the 
fact that he seems to say that intellectual discourse should only 
occur for ethical (utilitarian) and not epistemological reasons; 
that he does not search for foundations but merely wishes to 
explain “how things hang together”, and also that he avails 
himself of standard philosophical discourse while denying 
doing it.
The turn to a post-post-foundationalist orientation to life in 
general, and to education in particular
Christians in general, and Christian educators in particular, 
clearly find it difficult, if not impossible, to live and educate in the 
midst of the values patchwork characteristic of postmodernism 
(post-foundationalism). They are willing, on Biblical grounds, 
to examine the possibilities of living and educating on the basis 
of a radical centre of values which can be universally shared, as 
Turner suggested (see above). They regard, for instance, Chapter 
2 of the Constitution of South Africa (the manifest of human 
rights) as a radical centre of values on the basis of which South 
Africans have entered into a social contract with one another. 
However, as indicated, they regard these values as minimalist, 
needing to be filled with life and worldview content to make 
them meaningful to the individuals of which South African 
society is made up.
The Christian approach as such differs from a minimalist 
social contract approach in that the former rests on distinctive 
Biblical principles such as the recognition of creation by the 
triune God, the fall into sin by humanity, human depravity, 
redemption in Jesus Christ and sanctification through the Holy 
Spirit. These principles are so uniquely Christian that they 
cannot be shared by non-Christians and hence cannot form part 
of the radical centre of values. The question that now faces us 
is how Christians can adhere to these unique Biblical principles 
in the values-patchwork society in which they live and work in 
the early 21st century. One solution to this problem, not only for 
Christians, but for all people who entertain a life and worldview 
characterised by such unique principles, is to live in accordance 
with a post-post-foundationalist orientation. This contention 
will be substantiated in the remainder of this section. The final 
section of this article will be devoted to a brief discussion of the 
pedagogical implications of such a post-post-foundationalist 
orientation.
Whereas Turner and others experienced problems with the 
divisions brought about by the grand narratives associated 
with foundationalism and by the values-patchwork of post-
foundationalism and hence resorted to the search for a radical 
centre of values, and whereas Rorty questioned foundationalism 
as such and hence resorted to a wholesale rejection of 
foundations (cf. his anti-, post- or non-foundationalist stance), 
Wilber (2000:ix-x, 37), Wright (2010:131) and Olthuis (2012:2) 
went in search of an orientation that would acknowledge 
the possibility of built-in convictions to play their role in the 
background and hence enable one to steer through between 
claims regarding universal and absolute truths and an 
“anything goes” type of relativism (as embodied in, for instance, 
ludic postmodernism). A post-post-foundationalist approach 
will enable a thinker to steer through between modernism 
(foundationalism) “with its faith in reason, science and 
technology as the singular, linear, inexorable and progressive 
forces for health, knowledge, continual growth and success” 
on the one hand (Olthuis 2012:2), and postmodernism’s (post-
foundationalism’s) desire to embrace difference (mutual 
recognition, attunement and empowerment), deference for the 
other, difference, pluralism and love for the other. 
In line with a post-post-foundationalist2 orientation, Van 
Huyssteen (2004:10) argues for the abandonment of modernist 
notions of rationality typically rooted in foundationalism 
and the quest for secure foundations for the various domains 
of knowledge while on the other hand he rejects all forms of 
deconstructive postmodernism and the adoption of relativist 
forms of non-foundationalism or contextualism as reactions 
against universalist notions of rationality. His post-post-
foundationalist stance is clear: over against the objectivism 
of foundationalism and the extreme relativism of most 
forms of non-foundationalism, Van Huyssteen’s post-post-
foundationalist notion of rationality helps to acknowledge 
contextuality, the shaping role of tradition and of interpreted 
experience, while at the same time enabling scholars to reach 
out beyond their own groups, communities, and cultures, in 
plausible forms of inter-subjective, cross-contextual, and cross-
disciplinary conversations.
Scholars, as rational agents, are always socially and contextually 
imbedded. On this view, Van Huyssteen (2004:11) claims, 
rationality is alive and well in all the domains of human life. 
He argues that all the many faces of human rationality relate 
directly to a pre-theoretical reasonableness, a “common-sense 
rationality” that informs and is present in our everyday goal-
directed actions. From these everyday activities in ordinary 
time we can identify epistemic values like intelligibility, 
discernment, responsible judgement, and deliberation, which 
2 Van Huyssteen himself refers to this orientation as post-
foundationalist. Since postmodernism can be regarded as 
post-foundationalist, we refer to this orientation as post-post-
foundationalist, i.e. post-postmodernist.
Page 6 of 8
www.koersjournal.org.za
Original Research
dx.doi.org/10.19108/koers.80.1.2211
guide us when on an intellectual level we come to responsible 
theory choice and commitment. It is in the pursuit of these 
goals and ideals that we become rational persons as we learn the 
skills of responsible judgement and discernment, and where we 
articulate the best available reasons we have for making what we 
believe to be the right choices, those reasons we have for holding 
on to certain beliefs, and the strong convictions we have for acting 
in certain ways. For this reason we cannot talk abstractly and 
theoretically about the phenomenon of rationality anymore; 
it is only as individual human beings, living with other human 
beings in concrete situations, contexts, and traditions, that 
we can claim some form of rationality, Van Huyssteen avers. 
He then correctly argues that a person always relates to his or 
her world through interpreted experience only (Van Huyssteen 
2004:46, 118).
Olthuis’s (2012) arguments in favour of a post-postmodern 
worldview can similarly be construed to be post-post-
foundationalist. Olthuis (2012: 1) says, for instance, that in 
future worldviews need not be seen, in the first place, as 
conceptual systems but rather as faith-oriented, sensory 
expectancy filters operating implicitly and largely beneath 
our conscious awareness, i.e. somewhere in the background 
of our consciousness. It is now widely acknowledged that 
everyone comes outfitted with a wide array of pre-judgements, 
that everyone has built-in biases, and that all of these built-in 
convictions et cetera help us to gain our own peculiar perspective 
on what we experience in life. There are no innocent, unbiased 
ways of looking at the world; everyone looks at the world 
through a particular lens, window or frame. There is a limit 
to knowledge, and knowledge is never disinterested, neutral, 
a-temporal or a-spatial. There is, on the other hand, no such 
thing as Universal Reason to which one could authoritatively 
appeal; reason is always qualified and partial, in the service 
of wider and broader interests. There are no knock-down, 
airtight logical arguments that are universally valid, proving a 
certain position as unassailable. Grand narratives that purport 
to explain everything do not exist; no theory will ever be able 
to explain reality in all its facets (Olthuis 2012:3). Rather, 
Olthuis (2012:4) argues, from a post-post-foundationalist 
perspective worldview should not be seen as static, explicit 
and conceptually based but rather as a host of non-rational, 
unconscious and implicit ways of knowing and understanding 
that play their respective roles in the formation and function 
of worldviews. It is these implicit ways of knowing that require 
more and focused attention in a post-post-foundationalist 
world: a panoply of senses – an intuitive sensorium – aids our 
orienting in the world. He correctly observes: “… even if it is 
implicit, operating largely beneath our conscious awareness, 
we sense our way through the world as much, if not more, 
than we think our way through. Thus, what we have called 
a worldview is as much a matter of the imagination as of the 
intellect, as much unconscious as conscious, involving world-
feeling, world-touching, world-smelling and world-hearing. It 
is by our implicit, often inarticulate awareness of our intuition 
… by our bodily attunement, by our learned physical, emotional 
and moral reflexes, that we make our way in the world.” Post-
post-foundationalism “attends to and makes room for the 
invisible, the unconscious, the emotional, all the non-rational 
ways of knowing; not as second-rate, subservient, irrational 
forces to be repressed, feared or discounted, but as necessary, 
indispensable co-contributors in the multidimensional 
process of human development. […] everything is relational 
and contextual. The invisible and non-rational, as we have 
indicated, is just as important as the visible and the rational. 
What is not said is just as important, if not more so, than what 
is said” (Olthuis 2012:4-5).
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHRISTIAN EDUCATION 
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VALUES 
PATCHWORK OF POSTMODERNISM
What are the implications of a post-post-foundationalist 
orientation for Christian education? Olthuis (2012) has given a 
few, which can be summarised as follows. Firstly, the Christian 
educator with a post-post-foundationalist orientation should 
accept that the Christian life and worldview is only one among 
many. Although we share many of the same values with people 
of different persuasion, we fill those values with different life 
and worldview content, namely Biblical content. Although we 
share certain values with them, we fill them Biblically (Olthuis 
2012:3). We secondly recognise the need for the dethronement 
of reason (with a capital “R). We henceforth apply reason as 
common sense rationality and not as a divine principle. Life 
is more than just thinking and logic (Olthuis 2012:3-4).  In the 
third place, we should adapt to post-modern circumstances, 
among others by accommodating difference. A post-post-
foundationalist Biblical worldview needs to be hospitable to 
and respectful of difference. That is a Biblical mandate (Lv 
19:33), Olthuis (2012:2) says. The main thrust of Olthuis’ article 
is, in the fourth place, that educators should understand that 
“world-viewing and worldviews are about much more than 
seeing and vision. All of our senses are involved. We see, 
but also feel, touch, smell our way through the world. An 
intuitive … panoply of senses develops which implicitly aids 
our orienting. Indeed, even if it is implicit, operating largely 
beneath our conscious awareness, we sense our way through 
the world as much, if not more, than we think our way through. 
Thus, a worldview is as much a matter of the imagination as 
of the intellect, as much unconscious as conscious, involving 
world-feeling, world-touching, world-smelling and world-
hearing. It is by our implicit, often inarticulate awareness 
of our intuition … by our bodily attunement, by our learned 
physical, emotional and moral reflexes, that we make our way 
in the world. Recognising the role of all our senses in finding 
our way in the world suggests that we would do well to talk of 
world-orienting rather than world-viewing” (Olthuis 2012:4). 
In view of this, education becomes a process of world-orienting 
or world-viewing (Olthuis 2012:5). 
A post-post-foundationalist approach to education also has 
implications for the style of educating. If, in a pedagogical 
situation, the educator might attempt, in an authoritarian 
manner, to inculcate his or her values in the child,3 the very 
characteristics that makes a child unique are bracketed, denied 
or ignored. The differences between educator and child tend to 
be denied in this scenario. Reason denies the otherness of the 
3  The “banking” approach to education that Paulo Freire so vehemently 
rejected.
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other (in this case, the child). The credo of foundationalism 
was/is totalised mastery and control: educators tend to pass off 
their own pedagogical and value agendas on the (powerless) 
children as the voice of reason and authority (Olthuis 2012:3). 
A post-foundationalist approach, in contrast, purports not to 
depart from any a priori assumptions, in extreme cases, the 
attitude of “anything goes”. An educator with this theoretical 
attitude might be tempted to allow the child to follow its own 
head. The educator’s refusal to acknowledge the existence of 
pedagogical values in his life might lead him or her to let the 
child have free reign and to follow its own whims. 
A post-post-foundationalist approach, as the “new” option 
for the future, steers a course between these two extremes. A 
problem is approached with the understanding and realisation 
that assumptions and convictions indeed play their respective 
roles in the background, but should not be imposed on any 
other party, for instance a child. Solutions should be discovered 
in a socially constructive and interpretive manner during 
discussions and deliberations with the various parties involved. 
The pedagogical implications of this “new” approach are clear: 
pedagogical guidance takes the form of interaction with the 
child in which both consider the values concerned, and in 
which the child is allowed to freely adopt those values that 
make sense to him or her, not only on rational grounds, but also 
on the basis of intuition, under the guidance and influence of 
educators, and just plain common sense.
It is clear from the foregoing that from a post-post-
foundationalist perspective, all educators do work from some 
or other philosophical or life and world view foundation.  The 
difference between a foundationalist, a post-foundationalist 
and a post-post-foundationalist orientation lies in the degree 
to which the educator allows his or her philosophical or 
life and world view foundation to determine the course of 
the pedagogical process. In a foundationalist approach, 
the foundations will be applied deterministically to the 
pedagogical process; in a post-foundationalist approach, 
the pedagogical process will be allowed to play itself out 
indeterministically, without direction or guidelines, as it 
were. A post-post-foundationalist pedagogical orientation 
steers through between these extremes by employing a post-
post-foundationalist view of human reasoning, by leaving 
room for imagination, interpretation, experience, creativity, 
openness (open conversation), flexibility, inter-subjectivity and 
a willingness to adapt to circumstances. In terms of Christian 
education, this means that Biblical principles will be present in 
the pedagogical process but will play a role in the back of the 
educator’s mind; they will not be “up front” and “in your face”, 
as would have been the case in traditional (foundationalist) 
Christian education. The educator will occasionally deal 
consciously with the reasons for entertaining certain firm beliefs 
and strong convictions, but will try to restrict them to playing 
their role in the background of his or her thinking. Reflection 
of this nature will help the educator to interact purposefully 
and intentionally with the child, to act intelligently, wisely and 
on the basis of moral imagination. It will help him or her to 
forward reasons for doing things in a certain way.
Instead of authoritatively imposing certain forms of knowledge, 
understanding and principles on the child, the educator with 
a post-post-foundationalist orientation will accompany the 
child in a process of understanding the world on the basis 
of interpreted experience (on the basis of presuppositions, 
principles and convictions that subtly play their roles in the 
background). Through interpreted experience the child will 
build a life and worldview that is not static but constantly 
develops and unfolds, able to keep up with a world that is 
constantly changing and “sliding”. Education then becomes 
the process of helping the child understand his or her role 
as a rational agent in a changing world, as a person with 
the responsibility of dealing with contextuality, tradition, 
interpreted experience and reaching out to others (of the same 
and also of different life and world view persuasion). 
CONCLUSION
Educators in general and Christian educators in particular, 
have reached a cross-road. The children that they teach and 
educate nowadays, both at home, in the church or at school, 
live in the context of a postmodern or post-foundationalist 
orientation to life and to personal existence, in particular. The 
time has gone for educators to educate from an authoritative 
foundationalist perspective. Since it would not do justice to 
the education of children and young people to allow them to 
just muddle through in a world characterised by a patchwork of 
values, another pedagogical orientation should be considered. 
A post-post-foundationalist orientation to pedagogy seems to 
be most likely to succeed at the present juncture since it entails 
accompaniment of the child or young person through the 
postmodern maze.
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